

Misuse of Radioactive Material: First Responder Considerations

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7/24/2003

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First Responder Considerations



7/24/2003


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KEY POINTS TO REMEMBER

- A “Dirty Bomb” is conventional explosives combined with radioactive material
- This is **NOT** a nuclear explosion, the radioactive material does not enhance the explosion.
- Very few deaths would be expected from acute radiological exposure (the greatest hazard would likely be from the effects of the conventional explosives).
- First Responders can safely manage these events.
- The contamination will hamper emergency response efforts and can delay hospital treatment of casualties.
- Widespread contamination can have a significant psychological and financial impact.

A Case Study: Goiania, Brazil 1987

- When a hospital changed locations, a radiation therapy unit was temporarily left behind.
- Scrap metal hunters found the unit and dismantled it for scrap metal (~ Sept 18th).
- The 1.4 kiloCi (1,400 Ci) Cs-137 source containment was breached during the process.
- Pieces of source distributed to family and friends.
- Everyone was impressed by “the glowing blue stones.” Children and adults played with them.
- Serious radiological accident recognized on Sept 29th when Acute Radiation Syndrome symptoms were recognized by hospital staff.



Initial Response

112,000 people (10 % of Goiania's population) were surveyed at an Olympic Stadium.

- **250 were identified as contaminated**
- **50 contaminated people were isolated in a camping area inside the Olympic Stadium for more detailed screening**
- **20 people were hospitalized or transferred to special housing with medical and nursing assistance**
- **8 patients transferred to the Navy Hospital in Rio de Janeiro**
- **Residential contamination survey was initiated**



Early Consequences

- Widespread contamination of downtown Goiania
- 85 residences found to have significant contamination (41 of these were evacuated and a few were completely or partially demolished)
- People cross-contaminated houses 100 miles away
- Hot Spots at 3 scrap metal yards and one house



Radiation Injuries and Uptakes

- 4 fatalities (2 men, 1 woman and 1 child)
- 28 patients had radiation induced skin injuries (they held/played with the source for extended periods)
- 50 people had internal deposition (ingestion)





FIG. 9.3. 3–30 days after exposure. The skin was excised. A raw reddish surface is covered with a delicate layer of fibrinous exudate. Note the centripetal character of the healing process and the attempt of re-epithelialization.



Conclusions

- Long and expensive clean-up effort.
- Profound **psychological** effects such as fear and depression on large populations
- Isolation and boycott of goods by neighbors

IAEA-TECDOC-1009

*Dosimetric and
medical aspects of the
radiological accident in
Goiânia in 1987*



INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

IAEA

June 1998

Radiological Considerations for Public Protective Actions

- EPA-established radiological ***public*** dose action levels to facilitate decision making
- Based on projected dose levels at which specific protective actions are warranted to reduce or eliminate the dose ***which is yet to be received***
 - Early Phase
 - Actions that need to be initiated quickly
 - Dose projected to those standing outside over the first 4 days
 - Evacuation, sheltering, administration of stable iodine
 - Intermediate Phase
 - Actions can be taken weeks to months after the accident
 - Dose projections to those living in the contaminated areas
 - Relocation, actions to avoid ingestion of contaminated foods

Protective Action Guides (PAG)

- Early Phase
 - 4 day exposure to cloud (“plume”) immersion, cloud inhalation, groundshine, and resuspension:
 - 1 REM: consider evacuation or sheltering
 - 5 REM: consider evacuation
 - 25 REM Thyroid Dose: consider administration of stable iodine
- Intermediate Phase
 - Exposure to groundshine and resuspended material
 - 2 REM in first year, 0.5 REM in “second” year, 5 REM in first 50 years are levels at which relocation should be considered
 - Dose from ingestion
 - Expressed as deposition Derived Response Levels (DRL/DIL)
 - “Preventative” levels: 0.5 REM (1.5 REM Thyroid Dose)
 - “Emergency” levels: 5 REM (15 REM Thyroid Dose)

As an Example, if Brazil's Source was used as a "Dirty Bomb"



- This model makes unrealistic assumptions:
 - The source was 100% aerosolized
 - Lots of explosives (> 10 sticks of dynamite)
 - Presumes exposed populations "stood outside" during the 4 day exposure period
- Despite the accident in Brazil, sources of this strength are very difficult to obtain.

San Francisco Example: Ground Contamination Can be Detected East of Berkeley Hills

HYPOTHETICAL

**$\geq 0.5 \text{ uCi/m}^2$
Can be detected
with thin window
G-M meter**

Release: Cs-137, 1375 Ci aerosolized
Deposited Contamination

Color	Level (uCi/m^2)	Area (km^2)	Description
Blue	50	1.99	Population: 14,000 Take measures to prevent cross contamination
Cyan	5	24.43	Population: 24,000 Detectable with "hot dog" GM
Light Green	0.5	361.9	Population: 534,000 Detectable with "Pancake" GM

Release location: West of The Civic Center,
San Francisco, CA
 $37^\circ 46' 44'' \text{ N } 122^\circ 25' 22'' \text{ W}$

Winds near surface 10-15 mph from West.

**$\geq 5 \text{ uCi/m}^2$
Can be detected
with most dose
rate meters**

Despite the widespread contamination, the EPA PAG Would Recommend Shelter of only a Few Residential Blocks

HYPOTHETICAL

Release: Cs-137, 1375 Ci aerosolized
4-Day TEDE,
Evacuation/Relocation PAG

Doses (to those outside for 4 days) would exceed 1 rem only within a few blocks

Same dose as 1/3 of our natural annual background dose


Color	Level (Rem)	Area (km ²)	Description
Yellow	1	0.038	Population: 540 EPA guide for Shelter in place (No acute radiological effects)
Cyan	0.1	0.46	Population: 6,700 1/3 the annual natural background exposure
Green	0.01	3.94	Population: 15,000 Same dose as 2 round trip cross-country flights (cosmic radiation)

Release location: West of The Civic Center,
San Francisco, CA
37° 46' 44" N 122° 25' 22" W

Winds near surface 10-15 mph from West.

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Area that the population would need to be relocated because the annual dose > 5 rem (without any remediation of contamination)



Release: Cs-137,
1375 Ci aerosolized
1-Year Relocation PAG from Ground shine
HYPOTHETICAL

Color	Level (Rem)	Area (km ²)	Description
Yellow	5	0.72	Population: 9085 First Year Relocation PAG


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Dose Rates that will be seen by initial responders.

HYPOTHETICAL



HYPOTHETICAL

Release: Cs-137, 1375 Ci aerosolized
Gamma Dose Rate

Color	Level (mR/hr)	Area (km ²)	Description
	10	0.04	Population: 39 Consider Dosimetry for extended operations.
	1	0.5	Population: 772 Easily measured dose rate

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Site Contamination

The previous slides presumed 100% of the source material went “upward.” It is more realistic that more than half of the material will remain at the explosion site.

This might create:

- High Dose Rates at the scene (> 1 R/hr)
- Highly contaminated “blast” victims
- An inhalation concern for responders

Note: These issues can be safely managed and should not result in delayed medical care of the victims



Even with Protective Clothing, RADIATION Can Still be a Hazard

- Hazardous radiation can occur from
 - High Levels of Contamination (ground shine)
 - A poorly distributed source (hot spots)
 - Intact sources (or pre-distribution)
- NCRP-138 "Management of Terrorist Events Involving Radioactive Material" recommends first responder "turn back" radiation levels of:
 - 10 R/hour, or
 - 10 rem total dose

(Note: responders can safely work at these levels if their exposure is monitored and work activities planned)

DO NOT delay treatment of Medical Emergencies For Radiological Concerns

- Stabilize and remove medical emergencies from the scene
- Decontaminate patients only if stable

“Gross Decon”

(removal of outer clothing) removes most of the contamination

Patients can also be wrapped in blanket to prevent spread of contamination



Response to a Radiological Incident

~ Contamination ~

- Evacuate and “gross decon” victims (removal of outer clothing is an effective gross decontamination method)
- Monitor and isolate contaminated area
- Avoid breathing in radioactive material
 - Shelter in place (close windows, turn off heating and A/C)
 - Evacuate, when safe to do so
 - Wear respiratory protection
- Radioactive material will not be uniformly distributed. Radiation “Hot Spots” near the source of the event will be a hazard.



Additional Steps to Mitigate High Contamination Hazards in the Immediate Area of a Release


- Approach and establish hotlines upwind
- Reduce Resuspension
[Resuspension is the process of ground and plant contamination becoming airborne through the action of wind and/or activity]
 - Avoid activities that stir up dirt (driving, sweeping, etc..)
 - Apply “Fixative” (firefighting foam or even just misting water upwind of the site)

Response to a Radiological Incident

~ Radiation ~



- Time: Limit the time spent in an area of high radiation
- Distance: Exposure decreases dramatically as you increase your distance from the source.
- Shielding: Radiation is blocked by mass. When practical, operate behind objects (fire trucks, buildings, etc..)



Conclusion:

First Responder Considerations

- Acute health effects from radiation dose are unlikely without prolonged, high-concentration exposure.
- Contamination readily detectable at long distances.
- Medical emergencies take precedence over radiological monitoring.
- Wear respiratory protection, isolate area.
- Use decontamination techniques (removing outer clothing most effective)
- **Call for assistance**

References

Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP)

<http://www.em.doe.gov/otem/program.html>

Predictive Modeling Provided By

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